State of Utah v. Derek ChadChism : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
State of Utah v. Derek ChadChism : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; Attorneys for Appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Guy
Probert; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Derek Chad Chism: Brief of Appellee, No. 20030412 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4354
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DEREK CHAD CHISM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030412-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OR 
USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(III) (2002), IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
JAMES R. TAYLOR, PRESIDING 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
GUY PROBERT 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR - 6 20M 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DEREK CHAD CHISM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030412-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OR 
USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(III) (2002), IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
JAMES R. TAYLOR, PRESIDING 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
GUY PROBERT 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 5 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DEPUTY'S 
PERCEPTION THAT DEFENDANT APPEARED YOUNGER THAN 
AS INDICATED ON HIS LICENSE PROVIDED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO DETAIN HIM TO CHECK THE VALIDITY OF THE 
LICENSE AND TO CONDUCT A WARRANTS CHECK 5 
A. Investigative detention following a legitimate traffic stop must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity 6 
B. The deputy had reasonable suspicion to conduct a license and 
warrants check when he perceived defendant to be younger than 
as indicated on his license 7 
CONCLUSION 12 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A- Ruling 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) 6 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (1983) 6, 7, 12 
Michiganv. Summers, 452 U.S. 692(1981) 8 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) 7 
STATE CASES 
State v. Chapman,92l P.2d 446 (1996) 11 
State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, 994 P.2d 1278 7, 8 
State v. Co///ra, 2002 UT App 253, 53 P.3d 953 6 
State v. Despain, 2003 UT App 266, 74P.3d 1176 6 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) 8, 9, 10 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) 6, 8, 12 
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1990) 7 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Smith, 833 P.2d371 (Utah App. 1992) 7 
State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1997) 3 
State v. Fataez, 2003 UT App 100, 63 P.3d 1052 11 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2002) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-105 (2003) 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2002) 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DEREK CHAD CHISM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030412-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for attempted possession or use of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) 
(2002), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable James R. Taylor, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is: 
Whether the deputy's perception that defendant appeared younger than as indicated 
on his driver's license provided reasonable suspicion to detain him to check the validity of 
the license and to check for warrants? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to this issue. Underlying fact findings are 
reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The court's conclusions of law, 
however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" as regards the 
application of legal standards to the facts. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-40 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following constitutional provision is determinative of this case: 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession or use of a controlled substance and unlawful 
possession of paraphernalia ®. 1 -2). After he was bound over, defendant moved to suppress 
evidence ®. 26-27). Following a hearing, the court denied the motion ®. 40-41, 43-45). 
Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession or use of a controlled substance, a 
Class A misdemeanor, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress ®. 
65-67). The court sentenced defendant to 365 days in the Utah County Jail, but suspended 
the sentence and placed defendant on probation ®. 89-91). Defendant timely appealed ®. 
93). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
At midnight on June 2,2002, Deputy Jason Lee Randall of the Utah County Sheriffs 
Office was on patrol on Redwood Road, north of Highway 73 ®. 100:4-6). From his 
stationary patrol car, he noticed a vehicle tailgating another vehicle ®. 100:6). The deputy 
stopped the tailgating vehicle ®. 100:6). 
Approaching the stopped vehicle, Deputy Randall detected the odor of tobacco 
coming from inside the vehicle and saw two packs of cigarettes on the dashboard ®. 100:7). 
These observations interested him—"It appeared the occupants of vehicle-they appeared to 
be juveniles and not old enough to possess tobacco" ®. 100:7). The deputy asked the 
occupants—there appeared to be five—to stick out their tongues. Some of the occupants 
complied, revealing brown residue on their tongues, which indicated tobacco use ®. 100:7, 
15). The occupants admitted smoking ®. 100:7). 
Based on his observations and the occupants' admissions, Deputy Randall asked for 
their identifications to confirm that they were old enough to possess tobacco ®. 100:7). 
Defendant's driver's license indicated that his date of birth was August 15,1981, indicating 
that defendant was nineteen years old, old enough to smoke cigarettes ®. 100:13-14). The 
deputy also looked at defendant with his flashlight. Asked if defendant "matched" the 
picture on defendant's driver's license, the deputy answered, "It was close, yes" ®. 100:14). 
1
 The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing (R. 116). They are recited in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 
1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
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The license also did not appear to have been tampered with ®. 100:14). However, the deputy 
returned to his patrol car and ran all the identifications through the State computer to check 
their validity®. 100:7,15). As he ran one of the identifications, his dispatcher informed him 
that defendant had an outstanding warrant ®. 100:7-8). 
Deputy Randall arrested defendant on the warrant and began to search the vehicle, 
including a backpack which defendant acknowledged belonged to him ®. 100:8). In the 
backpack the deputy found two plastic baggies, one of which contained a white crystaline 
substance ®. 100:8). After giving defendant Miranda warnings, defendant admitted that the 
baggie belonged to him and that it contained cocaine ®. 100:8-10). The substance field 
tested positive for methamphetamine, but the crime lab later confirmed that it was cocaine 
®. 100:9). Defendant also admitted that he used the other, larger, baggie to store his 
marijuana®. 100:9-10). 
The charges in this case had previously been filed, an earlier preliminary hearing had 
been held, and the charges were dismissed ®. 100:11). Deputy Randall stated that the 
prosecutor had told him that those charges would be dismissed because of a suppression issue 
having to do with running a warrants check on a passenger ®. 100:11-12). The deputy 
acknowledged that in the prior case he informed the prosecutor that he had checked the 
identifications because he thought that they might be false ®. 100:12). He also stated that 
his standard operating procedure was to check the validity of identification through the state 
computer®. 100:12-13). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly held that the investigating deputy reasonably detained 
defendant to check the validity of his license to determine whether defendant was a minor 
in possession of tobacco. The evidence was undisputed that defendant was in possession of 
tobacco. The trial court found credible the deputy's perception that defendant appeared 
younger than the age indicated on his license, strongly suggesting that the license was false. 
The deputy could not more readily have determined defendant's actual age than by running 
a license check. During the brief detention to check the license, the deputy permissibly 
checked to see if there were any warrants outstanding. Upon discovery of an outstanding 
warrant, the deputy arrested defendant, and a search incident to the arrest uncovered 
controlled substances in defendant's possession. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DEPUTY'S 
PERCEPTION THAT DEFENDANT APPEARED YOUNGER THAN 
AS INDICATED ON HIS LICENSE PROVIDED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO DETAIN HIM TO CHECK THE VALIDITY OF THE 
LICENSE AND TO CONDUCT A WARRANTS CHECK 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the investigating deputy 
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by 
extending his detention to run a warrants check without reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity. Aplt. Br. at 6-9. Specifically, he argues that because there was no reason 
to believe that his license was not genuine, the deputy had no reasonable basis to run a 
warrants check. Aplt. Br. at 9-16. Because defendant dismisses a crucial factual finding of 
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the trial court supporting reasonable suspicion that the identification might not be genuine, 
his claim fails. 
A. Investigative detention following a legitimate traffic stop must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Collins, 2002 UT App 253, ^ 15, 53 P.3d 953 (citations 
omitted). 
"Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the 
meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment^, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and 
the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). To 
determine whether a traffic stop was reasonable, the reviewing court considers two 
questions: "(1) Was the police officer's action justified at its inception? and (2) Was the 
resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place?" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131-32 (Utah 1994) (internal 
quotations omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). "A traffic stop is 
justified at its inception when the stop is 'incident to a traffic violation committed in the 
officer's presence.'" State v. Despain, 2003 UT App 266, |^ 7, 74 P.3d 1176 (citations 
omitted).2 "Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 
2
 Defendant was stopped for making an improper signal after defendant's signal 
light remained on following a lane change (R. 116:5-6). On appeal, defendant does not 
challenge the legality of the traffic stop. Aplt. Br. at 9. 
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U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). "If there is investigative questioning that detains the driver beyond 
the scope of the initial stop, it 'must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity.'" State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6 4 10, 994 P.2d 1278 (citation omitted). 
B. The deputy had reasonable suspicion to conduct a license 
and warrants check when he perceived defendant to be 
younger than as indicated on his license. 
Defendant does not dispute that the vehicle in which he was traveling was 
legitimately stopped for tailgaiting. Nor does defendant dispute that if there was 
justification for the warrants check then his backpack was properly searched incident to his 
arrest on an outstanding warrant. Thus, the narrow question on appeal is whether Deputy 
Randall had reasonable suspicion to run the warrants check to determine if the license was 
genuine. 
"Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn 
from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." Chevre, 
2000 UT App 6, <| 10 (citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective 
facts suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal activity." State v. Menke, 
787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis added). "In developing a reasonable 
articulable suspicion, law enforcement officers are entitled to reach 'common-sense 
conclusions about human behavior.'" State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah App. 1992) 
(quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)). 
"If the officer reasonably suspects more serious criminal activity, 'the scope of the 
stop is still limited.'" Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, ^ 10 (citation omitted). "The officer must 
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'diligently pursue[] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel [his or her] 
suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant.'" Id. (citing 
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991)). 
In State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (1994), the Utah Supreme Court held that "running 
a warrants check during the course of a routine traffic stop does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that 
reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration and to issue a 
citation." Id. at 1133. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on dicta from Michigan 
v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), suggesting that "a warrants check during an investigatory 
stop would not violate the Fourth Amendment." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133 (citing Summers, 
452 U.S. at 700 n. 12). Quoting Summers, the court noted that during an investigatory stop, 
an officer may not only request identification and inquire about suspicious conduct, but also 
"' communicate with others, either police, or private citizens, in an effort... [to] determine 
whether a person of that identity is otherwise wanted' so long as the period of detention is 
not 'unduly long.'" Id. (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 700 n. 12). The Lopez court omitted, 
because irrelevant in that case, the following phrase identifying other reasons why police 
may communicate with others, to wit: "to verify the explanation tendered or to confirm the 
identification" Summers, 452 U.S. at 700 n.12 (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 9.2 pp. 36-37 (1978)). The court also stated, in discussing State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 
(Utah 1991), the principal authority relied on by defendant here, "we [did not] hold that a 
warrants check on a passenger could never be justified by specific articulable facts." Id. 
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In Johnson, the defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for an equipment 
violation. Id. 805 P.2d at 762. The name on the driver's license was not the name of the 
registered owner, which the officer had checked before stopping the car. Id. Also, the driver 
was unable to produce the registration. Id. Reasoning on these facts that the car might be 
stolen, the officer asked Johnson for identification. Id. Johnson denied having a driver's 
license or any identification, but did give the officer her name and date of birth. Id. Without 
any questioning to allay his belief that the car might be stolen and without any information 
that the car was stolen, the officer returned to his patrol car and ran a warrants check on both 
occupants. Id. The check revealed that Johnson had outstanding warrants. Id. A search of 
her backpack uncovered drugs. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the officer unreasonably detained the passenger 
on suspicion that the car was stolen just because neither occupant owned the car or could 
produce a registration certificate Id. at 764. The court noted that the officer failed to ask the 
driver and Johnson any questions that might have alleviated his suspicion that the car had 
been stolen. Id. It also set out the officer's testimony, which indicated that running a 
warrants check on the passenger—as opposed to checking stolen car records—would not 
be very helpful in determining whether the vehicle was stolen. Id. at 763-64. "Therefore," 
the court stated, "the leap from asking for the passenger's name and date of birth to running 
a warrants check on her severed the chain of rational inference from specific and articulable 
facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or 'hunch.'" Id. at 764 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883). 
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Consequently, the court held that given "the paucity of facts available to him, the officer's 
detention of the passenger beyond what was reasonably related in scope to the traffic stop 
was not justified by an articulable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime." Id. 
The trial court considered and correctly concluded that Johnson was distinguishable 
from this case (Ruling, R. 43-45, at 44, attached at Addendum A). Noting that the officer 
in Johnson was "proceeding from a lack of facts rather than observation of specific facts, 
the trial court recited those facts available to Deputy Randall: "1) the odor of tobacco; 2) the 
tobacco in view on the dashboard; 3) the apparent youth of the defendant; 4) the 
discoloration of the defendant's tongue; 5) the identification presented by the defendant 
indicating an age exceeding 19" ®. 43-44) (emphasis in original).3 On these facts, the 
court's finding that defendant "[p]lainly [] had been consuming tobacco and was at least in 
constructive possession of tobacco" was not clearly erroneous (&. 43). More importantly, 
the court found that u[t]he officer's subjective observation of [defendant's] age conflicted 
with the identification presented7' ®. 43). Consequently, the court correctly held that "the 
relatively brief time required to call in the information on the identification for 
confirmation—[during which time the officer was informed of defendant's outstanding 
warrant]—was a reasonable action given that disparity" ®. 43). 
3
 A person under the age of nineteen is prohibited from possessing tobacco. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-105 (1) (2003) ("Any 18 year old person who . . . has in his 
possession and . . . cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor. . ..") 
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The foregoing facts, particularly the deputy's observation that defendant appeared 
ypunger than the age indicated on the driver's license, far exceed the "paucity" of facts 
garnered to support the warrants check in Johnson, In Johnson, the officer knew only that 
the name on the driver's license was not the registered owner and that the driver could not 
produce the vehicle's registration. Such facts support only a slight possibility that a vehicle 
has been stolen, especially in the absence of any information that the vehicle has been stolen. 
In contradistinction to the facts of Johnson, a deputy's direct sense perception that defendant 
appeared younger than the age indicated on the license directly suggests that the license is 
false even if it otherwise appears valid.4 
Defendant argues that Deputy Randall could have dispelled his suspicions by asking 
the vehicle's other occupants about defendant's age or his license. Aplt. Br. at 16 (citing 
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764). However, based on the deputy's direct perception, which the 
trial court evidently found credible, additional questioning would not likely have allayed the 
deputy's suspicions. More importantly, the license check was almost certainly the quickest, 
4
 Defendant argues that facts demonstrating the lack of reasonable suspicion to 
detain defendant is comparable to those in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (1996) and 
State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, 63 P.3d 1052. Aplt. Br. at 11-13. The comparisons 
fail because lack of reasonable suspicion was demonstrable in those cases. In Chapman, 
the court held that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant for an NCIC 
check for stolen weapons once they had determined that the weapon found in his car was 
not being carried illegally and no other facts created a suspicion that the defendant was 
involved in illegal activity beyond violating a loitering ordinance. Id. at 453. Similarly, 
in Valdez, this court held there was no reasonable suspicion to run a warrants check once 
the defendant had shown his hands and dispelled any concerns that he was armed and 
dangerous. Id. ffl[ 7-8, 20-22. As argued above, the trial court found credible the 
deputy's perception that defendant's age was different than as indicated on the license, a 
fact strongly indicating that the license was false. 
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least intrusive means of determining its validity. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (1983) 
(citations omitted). Unlike Johnson, where the officer's checking the defendant's license and 
possible outstanding warrants would not likely have confirmed or dispelled his suspicions 
about an auto theft, the deputy's brief detention to check defendant's license would have 
substantially confirmed or dispelled his suspicions concerning defendant's true age. 
Therefore, running the warrants check for defendant was a legitimate detention attendant to 
determining the validity of defendant's license. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm defendant's convictions. _^, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6_ day of April, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Fourth judiciarD'Stru* Court 
of Utah County, State o\ utah 
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, : 
Plaintiff : Ruling 
vs. : Date: August 8,2002 
Derek Chad Chism, : Case Number: 011405189 
Defendant : Division I: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence. 
The narrow question presented by this motion surrounds the extent of the detention resulting in a 
warrants check and the subsequent arrest and search, incident to arrest, of the Defendant. The 
Defendant was a passenger in a car that the arresting officer observed to be "tailgating" or closely 
following another vehicle in a rural area of Utah County. When the officer went to the driver's 
side window of the car he detected an odor of tobacco and observed two packs of cigarettes on 
the dashboard. He noticed that the occupants of the car all appeared to be juveniles "not old 
enough to possess tobacco." The officer then, 
" . . . asked them to stick out their tongues to see if there was tobacco residue on 
their tongue. And some of them did that, and it came back brown residue on their 
tongue which showed tobacco use. . . . [the officer then] asked the occupants, 
because the tobacco was in plain view, and they admitted to smoking tobacco, I 
asked for identification, so I could be sure that the occupants of the vehicle would 
be old enough to be in possession of tobacco. . . . When they gave me their Ids, I 
took their Ids and returned to my vehicle and ran the Ids through the state 
computer, so I could verify that the information on the identification that they gave 
me was valid. . . .While I was running those identifications to insure that they were 
Page 1 of 4 
valid, my dispatch informed me that one of the Ids, Derrick Chism, had a warrant 
out for his arrest." (Preliminary Hearing pages 7 and 8). 
In State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761 (Utah, 1991) the Supreme Court held that evidence 
from a search of a passenger incident to arrest should have been suppressed. The Defendant in 
that case was a passenger in a car stopped for faulty brake lights. The driver of the car was not 
the registered owner of the vehicle and could not produce a registration certificate. Suspecting 
that the car was stolen the officer demanded identification information from the passenger and ran 
a "warrants check" on both the driver and the passenger. The Court noted that "in justifying the 
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion" Id. at 
764. Noting that the officer was proceeding from a lack of facts rather than observation of 
specific facts the Court held that with the paucity of facts available to him, the officer's detention 
of the passenger beyond what was reasonably related in scope to the traffic stop was not justified 
by an articulable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime." Id. at 764. The decision was 
explained, in dicta, in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah, 1994) "The 'paucity of facts' 
available to him [the officer in Johnston] simply did not justify the detention of the passenger. . . . 
We did not hold, however,. . . that a warrants check on a passenger could never be justified by 
specific articulable facts." Lopez, at 1133. 
In this case the articulated facts were 1) the odor of tobacco, 2) the tobacco in view on the 
Page 2 of 4 
00 
dashboard, 3) the apparent youth of the Defendant; 4) the discoloration of the Defendant's 
tongue; 5) the identification presented by the Defendant indicating an age exceeding age 19. The 
narrow issue is whether that information justified the Officer's action in seeking to verify the 
identification information on the State's computer system and whether that action unreasonably 
extended the detention of the Defendant. Plainly the Defendant had been consuming tobacco and 
was at least in constructive possession of tobacco. The officer's subjective observation of his age 
conflicted with the identification presented. The Court finds that the relatively brief time required 
to call in the information on the identification for confirmation was a reasonable action given that 
disparity. It was during that check that the officer was informed of the warrant for the arrest of 
the Defendant. Execution of the warrant and the search incident to arrest were appropriate. The 
motion to suppress is denied. 
Dated this 8th day of August, 2002 
V 
Jud| 
Fourth 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
Page 3 of 4 
House Bill 215 
House Debates 
February 11,1985 
CLERK: House Bill 215, Communications Fraud by Gale F. McCackney be it enacted by the 
Legislature of the state of Utah. 
SPEAKER: Representative McCackney. 
REP. MCCACKNEY: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Representatives, House Bill 215 is a much 
needed statute in the state of Utah to be used by state prosecutors in prosecuting and fighting 
white collar crime. The bill is patterned after a federal statute which has been in effect for many 
years and because Utah has not had an equivalent statute most of the white collar crime in this 
area has been prosecuted in the federal court system. This bill had a good hearing in the 
committee and there were some amendments which I point out to you that are in the book which 
were put in the bill in the committee. The theory of the bill is that a person need not be injured 
before we make it a crime and so it makes a crime the intentional communication of a disceptive 
or fraudulent plan or scheme. The problem that we've had in Utah is that we've relied on a theft 
by deception kind of concept which has required that the crime actually occur by having a person 
rely on deceptive misrepresentations or fraudulent misrepresentations and that injury result and 
also that the prosecutor prove at the time the case is at trial that the person when he was securing 
the money or whatever he was getting as a result of this scheme intended to keep it; and to prove 
intent is a very difficult thing. If a fellow says Well I intended really to make a lot of money on 
it and then pay him back and it just didn't work out that way. So prosecutors have had a difficult 
time in trying to deal with this kind of crime. I think it's a good bill. I would hope that you 
would support it. Would try to answer any questions if you have any. 
SPEAKER: Others to the bill Representatives? Seeing no other light... oh one more... 
Representative Palmer... pass. Representative McCackney? 
REP. MCCACKNEY: I'll waive sum-up and ask for your support on the bill. 
SPEAKER: Representative...I mean Carroll... Is that right? Ok. Voting is now open on House 
Bill 215 as amended. Voting is closed on House Bill 215 as amended. House Bill 215 as 
amended having received 58 affirmative votes and no negative votes passes this House and will 
be transmitted to the Senate for its further action. 
HB215 
Senate Debates 
February 27, 1985 
SPEAKER: Senator Hillyard. 
SEN. HILLYARD: Mr. President, I would move that we resolve it to a committee of the whole 
for two minutes to hear Mr. Brent Ward, the U.S. Attorney, to explain House Bill 215 to us. 
CLERK: HB215, Communications Fraud by Rep. McCackney. 
Mr. WARD: Mr. President, members of the Senate, this bill is recommended by the governor's 
security SWAT task force of which I am a member to help to repair Utah's image as a hotbed of 
securities and criminal fraud. One reason for this reputation is that Utah is at a disadvantage 
compared with other states because state and local prosecutors in Utah do not have all of the 
tools they need. This bill will give state and local prosecutors in Utah the same tools available to 
federal authorities and state and local authorities in other states across the country. It will ? a 
statute similar in fact to the most potent weapon in the arsenal of the United States Department of 
Justice. The language of the bill is based on the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes. These 
statutes have withstood the test of almost 100 years experience. In addition, in the House 
Judiciary Committee, the bill was refined to make doubly sure that no innocent person is 
prosecuted for bad business judgment or mere negligence. The bill passed in the House by a vote 
of 58-0. It is supported by the Utah Attorney General, the US Attorney, the statewide association 
of prosecutors, and other similar organizations. I've had the unfortunate experience of 
interviewing scores of victims of white collar crime in Utah. This bill would help to make sure 
that none of these people, at least have the consolation of knowing that the con artists who 
defrauded them will be brought to justice. And I urge that you support this bill. Thank you very 
much. 
PRESIDENT: Any questions? 
SEN. HILLYARD: Seeing none, I would move to dissolve the committee of the whole. 
PRESIDENT: HB215 shows 26 ayes, no nays, 3 being absent. The bill passes signed by the 
President of the session, refer to the House without further action. 
